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When considering how a complex system operates, the observable behavior depends upon both
architectural properties of the system and the principles governing its operation. The behavior of
computer chess programs, for instance, depends upon both the processing speed and resources of
the computer and the programmed rules that determine how the computer selects its next move.
Despite having very similar search techniques, a computer from the 1990s might make a move that
its 1970s forerunner would overlook simply because it had more raw computational power. From
the na¨ıve observer’s perspective, however, it is not clear if a particular move is dispreferred or
overlooked because of computational limitations or the search strategy and decision algorithm. In
the case of computers, evidence for the source of any particular behavior can ultimately be found
by inspecting the code and tracking the decision process of the computer.
But with the human mind, such options are not yet available. The preference for certain be-
haviors and the dispreference for others may theoretically follow from cognitive limitations or from
task-related principles that preclude certain kinds of cognitive operations, or from some combination
of the two. This uncertainty gives rise to the fundamental problem of finding evidence for one ex-
planation over the other. Such a problem arises in the analysis of syntactic island effects – the focus
of this volume. These involve the low acceptability ratings elicited by sentences with long-distance
dependencies into certain syntactic configurations, as well as the general rarity of such utterances
in attested speech or text (Chomsky 1962, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1986; Ross 1967). What makes island
constructions of particular interest is the fact that the traditional syntactic analyses behind them
have been highly influential in the development of syntactic theories – movement-based analyses of
syntactic and semantic phenomena, in particular.
As our knowledge of language processing has increased, the possibility of an alternative to
grammar-based accounts of island effects has emerged: perhaps these low judgments are a conse-
quence of the processing difficulty comprehenders face when reading or listening to these sentences,
as argued for by Deane (1991), Kluender (1991, 1998), and Kluender and Kutas (1993). Building
on this work, we have provided evidence for the role of processing pressures in island phenomena
elsewhere, as reflected by reading times (Hofmeister 2007; Hofmeister, Jaeger, Sag, Arnon, and
Snider 2007; Sag, Hofmeister, & Snider 2007; Hofmeister & Sag 2010). Here, our goal is to assess
certain arguments that have been made to the effect that grammatical constraints must be involved
in island phenomena. Our criticism of these arguments is not meant to exclude the possibility that
grammatical constraints play a role in island effects – in the absence of precisely formulated, ob-
servationally adequate grammatical accounts of island effects, any such argument is most likely
futile. In spite of this difficulty, it is our contention that independently motivated processing fac-
tors can successfully explain a substantial amount of the judgment variation that has been used to
motivate island constraints within grammar. Hence, a number of such grammar-internal structural
constraints need not be assumed as being part of the human biological endowment for language.
Over the course of this discussion, we weigh the adequacy of several types of evidence invoked
in support of grammatical accounts of island phenomena. These include satiation effects, the
relationship between working memory and judgments of acceptability, and data from filled-gap
paradigms and plausibility manipulations.
Much of the relevant evidence relies at least partially on acceptability judgments. This reliance
is not particular to arguments about island effects – acceptability judgments form the bedrock of
syntactic theory. But as numerous linguists and researchers have pointed out, they are an imper-
fect window into the mind (Chomsky & Miller 1963; Miller & Chomsky 1963; Fodor 1978; Schu¨tze
1996; Cowart 1997; Hofmeister & Sag 2010; Staum Casasanto, Hofmeister, & Sag 2010). That is,
one-dimensional scores derived from acceptability experiments potentially reflect the contributions
of multiple factors, making it extremely difficult to identify the role of any one factor – ungram-
maticality, contextualization difficulty, semantic anomaly, processing difficulty, etc. The difficulties
of interpreting acceptability judgments are, of course, not unique to that method. Reading times,
eye movements, reaction times, and other dependent measures are all indirect ways of quantifying
internal cognitive states of a speaker or listener, which we have no direct access to. As a result, all
such data potentially reflect the interaction of many diverse factors, which can make it challenging
to attribute observed variation in one dimension to a specific type of constraint.
In order to assess the kinds of evidence relevant to the debate over the status of island effects
(henceforth, the islands debate), the state of our knowledge about many of them, especially accept-
ability judgments, must be reevaluated. Researchers (ourselves included) have attempted to use
acceptability judgments to adjudicate contentious issues (as in the islands debate) without a well-
informed understanding of how judgments vary in uncontroversial contexts. Part of our analysis
here, therefore, is informed by experimental data comparing sentences which exhibit uncontroversial
processing difficulty, but no other deficit, to those containing grammatical violations. By looking
at these clear cases, we can provide a principled basis for our treatment of controversial examples
in terms of processing or grammar.
In the end, we argue that many of the findings from studies putatively supporting grammar-based
interpretations of island phenomena have plausible, alternative interpretations rooted in specific,
well-documented processing mechanisms. In other instances, we suggest that the experimental
measures are not understood well enough at present for them to be used as decisive evidence for
either grammar-based or processing-based of island effect. Though the grammar-external explana-
tions that we isolate render many familiar grammatical proposals obsolete (e.g. the subjacency
condition, the superiority/minimal link condition), we can of course not conclude that
grammatical constraints have no role to play in the explanation of island phenomena. However,
based on a review of the available evidence, it is likely that a prerequisite for future progress in the
islands debate is a better understanding of the available sources of linguistic evidence.
1 Island Effects
The classic data surrounding island effects indicate that unacceptability results when dependencies
enter into certain syntactic configurations, such as relative clauses (1) and interrogative clauses (2)
(Ross 1967; Chomsky 1973, 1977, 1981, 1986).
(1) This is the puzzle that we met the mathematician [who solved ].
(2) What did Craig wonder [whether the doctors knew ]?
Within the class of islands, however, changes to lexical items, the similarity of discourse references,
the syntactic and semantic content of the dislocated items, and other manipulations can radically
alter the acceptability of the islands, even though they leave the grammatical structure intact (see
Hofmeister & Sag 2010 for a review). Indeed, many linguists have argued that island effects go away
under certain circumstances (Ross 1967; Chomsky 1973; Cinque 1990; Rizzi 1990; Pesetsky 1987,
2000; Deane 1991). The example in (3) from Ross (1967), for instance, violates the subjacency
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condition, while (4) counterexemplifies Chomsky’s (1973) Subject Condition. Moreover, extraction
out of non-finite clauses appears in general to be more acceptable than extraction out of finite
clauses, as shown in (5) (‘A > B’ indicates that A is more acceptable than B):
(3) Which reports does the government prescribe the height of the lettering on (the covers of)
?
(4) . . . many also were seized and sold into slavery, of which only some had been ransomed
at the time he wrote.
(5) a. Which questions did he know how to answer ? >
b. Which questions did he know how he should answer ?
The typical response from defenders of a grammar-based view of islands is that counterexamples
such as these have some special characteristic that nullifies or weakens syntactic island constraints.
For instance, a recurring claim regarding counterexamples is that they exhibit different syntactic
structure, often in the form of hidden constituents or structure, such as null resumptive pronouns
or an invisible syntactic controller (Georgopoulos 1985, 1991; Saah & Goodluck 1995; Phillips in
press). Such proposals have failed to provide independent evidence for these otherwise unmotivated
assumptions.
In contrast, the variation in acceptability judgments for island-violating sentences frequently
seems to correlate with differences in factors known to affect processing difficulty, e.g. depth of
embedding, similarity-based interference, structural ambiguity, collocational frequency, implausi-
bility (Deane 1991; Kluender 1991; Kluender 1998; Hofmeister & Sag 2010). For instance, using
syntactically and semantically richer wh-phrases (e.g. which book rather than what) typically results
in better-sounding sentences (Hofmeister & Sag 2010). But this change also significantly improves
processing at retrieval sites in long-distance dependencies, as shown by reading time studies using
sentences not containing island structures (Hofmeister 2007, 2011). In fact, the defining features of
islands have also been linked to processing difficulty. Besides the general cost of filler-gap depen-
dency processing, processing clause boundaries generally leads to lower acceptability ratings and
increased processing times (Frazier & Clifton 1989; Kluender & Kutas 1993; Kluender 1998). And
as pointed out in Hofmeister & Sag (2010), islands such as wh-islands and complex NP islands often
create garden-path environments.
An attractive feature, then, of a processing-based view of these phenomena is that general
processing principles can be used to account not only for the major acceptability contrasts, but also
for the observable variation associated with manipulations that leave the island structure intact.1
In contrast, analyses couched in terms of grammatical principles generally leave this variation
unexplained, or dismiss it as uninteresting peripheral data. Some grammatical accounts of islands,
1Phillips (this volume) suggests that this is not a point in favor processing accounts, on the grounds that an
account rooted in independently motivated processing constraints fails to explain why ‘filler-gap dependencies have
a much stronger impact in island contexts than they do in non-island contexts’. Such ‘superadditivity’ effects, how-
ever, are not uncommon in studies of processing difficulty, attention, and multi-tasking: processing costs combine
superadditively due to either resource limitations or processing bottlenecks (Pashler 1994). A processing account of
island constraints is thus very much at home with these superadditivity effects. Elsewhere, we show that superad-
ditive decrements in acceptability are, in fact, a hallmark of combining significant sentence processing costs (Staum
Casasanto et al. 2010).
4
however, have provided detailed accounts of how such putative counterexamples might be explained
(Pesetsky 1987, 2000; Rizzi 1990; Cinque 1990; Manzini 1992). Unfortunately, these accounts almost
all stand and fall with ad hoc, unmotivated assumptions and fuzzy definitions that make them either
empirically untestable or else mere descriptive labels (Chung 1994; Hofmeister 2007; Hofmeister &
Sag 2010; Hofmeister, Jaeger, Arnon, Sag, and Snider in press).
Evaluating the proper role of grammar—particularly syntactic constraints—in islands effects is
complicated by the fact that the field presently lacks an explicit, comprehensive theory of gram-
matical island constraints that also provides a rigorous treatment of the numerous counterexamples
that have been observed in the literature. The most recent incarnation of transformational syntax
in Chomsky’s (1995, 2000) Minimalist Program glosses over island effects, providing no account of
how these emerge from grammatical principles. Moreover, accounts that reject processing-based
analyses of island effects offer no explicit grammar-based alternative (Phillips in press; Sprouse,
Wagers, & Phillips in press). Unfortunately, this makes it effectively impossible to explicitly com-
pare grammatical accounts of the phenomena with processing accounts. This leads us to assess the
success of a kind of argument, based on psycholinguistic evidence, contending that island effects
must have some grammatical foundation without specifying what that foundation is or what is
standing on it.
2 Filled gap and plausibility effects (or the lack thereof)
Over the past twenty years, a considerable amount of experimental data has been adduced to
support grammar-based accounts of island effects. Among the relevant studies are experiments
showing no evidence of dependency formation into island environments. These results have been
taken as validation of the claim that grammar forbids attempts to associate items within a syntactic
island with items external to that island. In this section, we consider this type of evidence and
weigh its relevance to the islands debate.
Evidence of this sort comes from two general paradigms: filled-gap effect and plausibility exper-
iments. The first originates with research by Stowe (1986), which finds elevated reading times at
non-empty potential gap positions in sentences involving long-distance dependencies, in contrast to
minimally different sentences without a long-distance dependency:
(6) a. The teacher asked what the team laughed about Greg’s older brother fumbling.
b. The teacher asked if the team laughed about Greg’s older brother fumbling the ball.
Stowe observed that reading times following the preposition in (6a) shot upward compared to the
same region in (6b). These elevated reading times were interpreted as indicating an unsuccessful
attempt to integrate the filler (what) as the preposition’s direct object, a role that is already filled
by the overt noun phrase (Greg’s older brother) in (6a). In short, the parser makes a prediction
about where to interpret the wh-phrase, but finds counter-evidence that causes it to reconsider the
initial analysis. Crucially, these ‘filled-gap effects’ provide a means for showing that the reader has
attempted to create a syntactic dependency. Plausibility studies like Traxler & Pickering (1996)
similarly produce signs of dependency creation. Evidence for this comes from signs of difficulty at
the lexical head of the dependency when the head and its argument are semantically implausible
together:
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(7) That’s the pistol/the garage with which the heartless killer shot the hapless man yes-
terday afternoon.
Since the logic behind plausibility and filled-gap experiments is much the same, we focus here on
filled-gap paradigms, but the arguments apply equally to plausibility paradigms.
Through the use of the filled-gap paradigm, it has been shown repeatedly that filled-gap effects
do not appear within at least some island environments (Stowe 1986; Bourdages 1992; Pickering,
Barton, & Shillcock 1994; McElree & Griffith 1995; Traxler & Pickering 1996; Phillips 2006):
(8) a. The teacher asked what the silly story about Greg’s older brother was supposed to mean.
b. The teacher asked if the silly story about Greg’s older brother was supposed to mean
something.
Similar findings appear in plausibility studies: participants do not show signs of disruption when
they reach an implausible lexical head that occurs inside a syntactic island (Traxler & Pickering
1996; Phillips 2006). The absence of these effects in island environments is taken as proof that
dependencies into these domains are not attempted, or as Phillips (2006: 813) puts it: “the parser
avoids constructing gaps inside islands that cannot be licensed”.
However, the existence of grammatically-based island constraints is not the only possible expla-
nation for why filled-gap effects might not occur in island contexts. Wagers and Phillips (2009),
for instance, observe that “[t]here is a general concern that many of the environments tested are
independently complex to process and, for that reason, dependency construction is difficult or sel-
dom observed in those domains” (p. 423).2 As noted in Hofmeister and Sag (2010), the absence of
filled-gap effects may also follow from expectations regarding the syntactic positions that are more
or less likely to host a gap site.
Indeed, much recent work in psycholinguistics suggests that comprehension involves probabilis-
tic, predictive processing (Seidenberg & MacDonald 1999; Crocker & Brants 2000; Hale 2001; Levy
2008). From this perspective, retrieving and integrating filler-phrases involves probabilistic predic-
tions about the appropriate retrieval site, providing a natural account of many contrasts that have
been noted in the literature. For example, Pickering and Traxler (2001) suggest that the parser may
2Wagers & Phillips (2009) address this issue by examining constructions of putatively comparable complexity:
parasitic gap constructions such as The wines which the gourmets were energetically discussing before slowly
sipping during the banquet were rare imports and across-the-board coordinate extractions like The wines which
the gourmets were energetically discussing and slowly sipping during the banquet were rare imports. They show
that there are no signs of dependency creation in parasitic gaps in adjunct islands using plausibility manipulations.
Critically, sentences with across-the-board extractions from verb phrase coordinations do show signs of dependency
creation in the second conjunct. Since these sentence types receive similar acceptability scores, this seems to argue
that the absence of dependency creation effects in adjunct islands cannot be explained in terms of complexity.
It is conceivable, however, that readers are forming a dependency, given that comprehension accuracy did not
differ across conditions in their reading time study (Experiment 1) and the overall mean was quite high (88.8%)
(Wagers & Phillips, 2009: 409). This suggests that either the method is not sensitive enough to detect dependency
formation within the island. Otherwise, there is no explanation for how participants could understand the parasitic
gap sentences with such high accuracy. Regardless, there is a more substantial flaw in their argumentation. While
comparing acceptability judgments to processing complexity can yield useful insights, they are not perfect images
of each other: differences in complexity are not necessarily reflected in acceptability judgments (for evidence of this,
see Sprouse (2008)). Consequently, it may well be that sentences containing parasitic gaps in adjuncts differ in
complexity from their coordinate counterparts in ways not detectable by acceptability judgments.
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simultaneously entertain several candidate gap sites before encountering the true gap in a filler-gap
dependency, as in (9) (see also Boland, Tanenhaus, Garnsey, and Carlson (1995)):
(9) a. That’s the diver that the coach persuaded a few pupils to watch before the tournament.
b. That’s the event that the coach persuaded a few pupils to watch before the tournament.
The possibility that the diver in (9a) is the object of persuade – plausible on semantic grounds – is
at least momentarily considered in real-time, creating a filled-gap effect when the true object a few
pupils is encountered. In comparison, no filled-gap effect emerges in (9b) at the object phrase, nor
does a plausibility effect occur at the verb. Since the direct object analysis becomes implausible
in (9b) by the time the verb persuaded is processed, the parser appears to forego an attempt to
integrate the filler with the direct object position. Instead, the parser turns to the alternative
infinitival complement analysis and thus does not experience difficulty at the subsequent NP. In
short, the absence of filled-gap effects in (9b) does not license the conclusion that the grammar
prohibits making a dependency between the object of the verb and the clefted element. If this is
the case, then the absence of evidence for dependency creation in island contexts may similarly
follow from extra-grammatical factors.
On the expectation-based view, therefore, filled-gap effects are due to the fact that a particular
syntactic environment, e.g. a verb or other subcategorizing element, has a reasonable contextual
probability for hosting the gap being processed. Crucially, such effects may be absent when factors
(structural or otherwise) conspire to reduce this probability significantly. For instance, if an object
gap is strongly predicted in a given sentence context (given local cues and past experience with such
constructions), a gap within a preceding complex subject would have a low probability, making signs
of a dependency inside the complex subject unlikely. This scenario leaves open the possibility that
gaps within complex subjects can be predicted and posited, given sufficient cues that change the
parser’s expectations.
Our claim that the absence of filled-gap effects may reflect probabilistic biases about where to
integrate the filler raises the question of where these biases come from. One possibility is that
when cognitive resources are stretched thin or occupied at certain points in sentence processing,
memory retrieval that would compound processing difficulty is avoided. In other words, if certain
syntactic environments generally impose high processing demands, resource limitations may inhibit
linguistic operations such as restoring a filler from memory. This type of explanation leaves open
the possibility that the magnitude of the environment’s processing difficulty can be reduced, making
dependency creation more likely. The idea is simply that the parser is more likely to attempt an
operation when it has sufficient time and resources, and less likely to do so when it does not.
As Phillips (in press) acknowledges, the absence of filled-gap effects is ultimately compatible
with “reductionist accounts”, but “equally compatible with formal grammatical accounts of the
constraint.” We agree with this assessment. The evidence from the processing of non-islands shows
that signs of dependency creation can be absent in syntactic environments even when the parser
clearly can make such associations under different circumstances. Thus, the absence of filled-gap
effects and their correlates in plausibility paradigms have other viable explanations which do not
invoke grammatical island constraints.
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3 Effects of Repeated Exposure
Acceptability judgments sometimes rise over the course of the experiment, a phenomenon that has
been labeled ‘structural facilitation’, ‘satiation’, and ‘priming’ (Luka & Barsalou 2005; Sprouse
2007a, 2007b, 2009; Francom 2009; Hofmeister et al. in press). Whatever the name, this phe-
nomenon is potentially of importance in the islands debate: if a particular kind of ungrammatical
sentences lack a coherent representation, then no matter how many times such a sentence is seen,
judgments should remain consistently low (Sprouse 2007a). By contrast, sentences judged to be
unacceptable due to processing difficulty ought to become easier to process with familiarity, and
consequently receive higher judgments of acceptability (see Wexler and Culicover (1980)). Given
these assumptions, identifying the source of island effects theoretically becomes as simple as seeing
whether judgments of island-violations rise throughout the course of an experiment.
Along these lines, Sprouse (2007a: 123) reports that acceptability judgments for a variety of
island types do not increase significantly with repeated exposure and thus concludes that “there
are no syntactic priming effects on acceptability for ungrammatical structures,” referring to island-
violating structures. Under a theory of categorical grammaticality, these results are expected if
islands lack a licit representation because they are ungrammatical. Thus, the absence of repeated
exposure effects lends credence to the idea that the unacceptability of islands stems from grammat-
ical constraints. Sprouse (2007a: 123) further suggests that “that asymmetric extra-grammatical
effects on acceptability may be a useful tool for identifying the grammatical status of structures
that are neither clearly grammatical or clearly ungrammatical.”
However, the overall evidence regarding the effects of exposure on judgments for island-violating
sentences is rather mixed. Snyder (2000) found that judgments for several types of island-violations
rise with exposure, while Sprouse (2007b) discovered that these changes disappear after equalizing
the number of sentences that elicit acceptable and unacceptable judgments. But other researchers
have replicated the finding that judgments for island-violating sentences increase with repetition
(Francom 2009; Hofmeister & Sag 2010) and others have shown that reading times for island-
violating structures decrease with exposure (Braze 2002; Hofmeister et al. in press).
These differences with respect to exposure may potentially be explained in terms of different
items, different island types, different acceptability scales, different presentation methods, etc. But,
besides the conflicting results, there is a more serious problem with interpreting past results on
repeated exposure: it has never been established that judgments for difficult grammatical sentences
increase with repeated exposure, but those for ungrammatical sentences do not. Before interpreting
repeated exposure data with respect to islands, we need to know how exposure affects uncontro-
versial cases. For starters, the findings from Luka & Barsalou (2005) indicate that sentences of
‘moderate grammaticality’ do increase with exposure, e.g. Sam recites poems as well as playing the
piano. Minimally, this implies that at least some sentences with structural abnormalities become
better with familiarity. It also raises the possibility that even sentences that are uncontroversially
ungrammatical might improve with exposure.
To investigate this, we conducted an acceptability experiment studying uncontroversial sources
of unacceptability, using the Thermometer Judgment (TJ) methodology described in Featherston
(2008). In TJ studies, participants judge the test items compared to two reference sentences;
however, they are not asked to assess magnitudes of acceptability differences as in ME. One of
the reference sentences is quite good and the other quite bad, and we follow Featherston (2008) in
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assigning these sentences the arbitrary values 20 and 30. For all of the experiments described here,
we used the same reference sentences:
(10) a. The way that the project was approaching to the deadline everyone wondered. [= 20]
b. The architect told his assistant to bring the new plans to the foreman’s office. [= 30]
Sentences were shown word-by-word at a fixed rate of presentation in the center of the screen
(250 ms + (33.33 ms ∗ the number of characters in the word)), so that longer words remained
visible for longer. We used word-by-word presentation (not full sentence presentation) in order to
prevent excessive introspection about the test sentences; the presentation was auto-paced (rather
than self-paced) so that there would be no differences in how long each participant studied a given
stimulus.
For the statistical analysis, we first log-transformed all acceptability scores and then computed z-
scores for each subject on the basis of their judgments for all experimental items, including fillers. We
then excluded data points with z-scores more than 2.5 standard deviations from the subject’s mean.
Finally, we used linear mixed-effects (LME) models for data analysis. All predictors which provided
the basis for higher order variables (interactions) were centered to reduce effects of collinearity. In
all the experiments we discuss, we used a maximal random effect structure for the LME model with
random intercepts for participants and items, and by-participant and by-item random slopes for
any fixed effect factors. Log-likelihood ratio tests, where the deviance of a model containing a fixed
effect is compared to that of an otherwise identical model without it, were used to obtain p-values
(Pinheiro & Bates 2000; Baayen 2007).
In the first experiment, 28 Stanford University community members (all native English speakers)
saw 12 items that had multiple words moved to illicit positions, as in (11) (materials can be found
at the first author’s website):
(11) Iran has gun-control strict laws that bar private citizens carrying from firearms.
Any adequate grammar would treat sentences like (11) as ungrammatical. Nevertheless, the in-
tended message of such sentences is not difficult to understand.
As shown by Figure 1, the jumbled items received significantly higher ratings, the later they
appeared with respect to each other in the experiment (β = .051, SE = .015, t = 3.38, p = .003).
This consequently means that grammaticality is not a precondition for observing the facilitation
effects of repetition. So, if ungrammatical strings can in fact prime, then even grammar-based
accounts of island phenomena should predict that judgments for island violations ought to improve
with increased exposure.
Why do these ungrammatical items get better with repeated exposure? Francom (2009) hypoth-
esizes that the extent of exposure-related effects on acceptability judgments depends upon more
than just grammaticality. Drawing on research by Freedman and Forster (1985) and by Maclay and
Sleator (1960), Francom notes that subjects provide similar ratings whether they are asked to judge
according to grammaticality or meaningfulness. Accordingly, acceptability judgments for items like
(11) may increase with exposure because participants rely less and less on word order cues to form
meaningful interpretations. Interpretability therefore appears to have a major role in whether some
structure becomes more acceptable with repetition.
As to why island violations become more acceptable with exposure in some cases and not
others, we can only conjecture based on the available evidence. Some experimental materials may
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Figure 1: Mean acceptability z-score by list position, according to a linear regression model; dotted
lines indicating 95% confidence intervals.
introduce excessive processing difficulty. That is, sentences with massive processing difficulty may
never get better over time because whatever facilitating effects may come from increased exposure,
they cannot compensate for the overall difficulty of the items. Evidence for this hypothesis comes
from an experiment using twelve doubly-nested, center-embedding structures, such as (12), with 24
University of California - San Diego undergraduates as participants:
(12) The cheerleader who the quarterback who was on the team dated snubbed the teammates
although this hurt her reputation.
There were no signs that repeated exposure improved judgments for these items (β = .012, SE =
.020, t = 0.60, p = .56). While this is a null result, it suggests that repetition effects may not
always be observed in the presence of major hurdles to successful processing, even if the sentences
are ‘grammatical’, as these are standardly assumed to be.
Fundamentally, we are left with the conclusion that the field lacks a firm understanding of
why some structures get better with exposure and not others. A full understanding will likely
involve considering a complex interplay of sentence interpretability, processing difficulty, and the
relative ease with which structural anomalies can be identified and corrected. In any case, the
critical assumption that judgments of ungrammatical sentences will not improve with exposure,
while judgments of sentences that are merely difficult to process will improve does not seem to
be accurate. Hence, data from repeated exposure studies cannot yet inform us of the respective
weights of grammar and processing in producing island effects.
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4 The relationship between working memory capacity and judgments of acceptability
A third type of argument that has been offered in favor of grammar-based accounts of islands
concerns the relationship between acceptability judgments and individual differences in working
memory (WM) (Sprouse et al. in press). This line of argumentation proposes that processing-based
accounts of island phenomena predict that island sensitivity should vary with processing resource
capacity. Consequently, WM measures, such as n-back and serial recall tasks, should correlate
with the strength of island effects. Sprouse et al. (in press) tested this prediction by conducting a
large-scale study with four different types of island-violations: wh-islands, subject islands, adjunct
islands, and complex NP islands. According to their findings, individual differences in performance
on the memory tasks accounted for a small amount of the overall variance (0%-2%). These findings
seem to run counter to the predictions of a processing-based perspective on island effects, lending
indirect support to the conclusion that island effects arise from grammatical constraints.
One problem with using correlations with WM to infer whether a phenomenon has a grammat-
ical or processing basis is that there are a variety of means for measuring WM, as Sprouse et al.
acknowledge. So a possible explanation for their null result is that the specific choice of working
measures—n-back tasks and serial recall—tap memory and cognitive resources of minimal impor-
tance to island processing. In defense of their means for measuring WM, Sprouse et al. contend
that most measures of WM are highly correlated, citing Conway et al. (2005). The clear suggestion
is that the choice of another WM measure would lead to a similar null result. They further claim
that it is improbable that a WM measure exists which reflects sensitivity to islands, but which does
not correlate with performance on either the serial recall or the n-back task.
However, Conway et al. (2005) never state that most measures of WM are highly correlated.
Rather, they provide evidence that WM scores from reading span, counting span, and operation
span tasks (not n-back tasks or serial recall tasks) are highly correlated with one another, as well
as performance on a range of higher order cognitive tasks, such as reading comprehension. Conway
et al. (2005) also explicitly note that tasks like the n-back task “present quite different cognitive
demands” from WM span tasks and that “the n-back task may be a more appropriate indicator
of the construct measured by STMC [short term memory capacity], rather than by WMC tasks”
[pp. 780-781]. This is not to say that we advocate WM span tasks as the best means for predicting
performance in sentence processing; we are simply reiterating a point made by Conway et al. (2005):
little data currently exists that can help us evaluate how different measures of WM reflect underlying
cognitive abilities. Conway et al. (2005) also note that correlations between span tasks range from
.40 to .60, “suggesting that they are indeed tapping some common process or ability but also
suggesting that they are not identical” [p. 780]. In general, it is inaccurate to assume that because
two WM measures are highly correlated, they will necessarily reflect similar sensitivities to islands.
So, even if there were evidence that all other sensible measures of WM are correlated with at least
one of the tasks used by Sprouse et al, this would still not license the conclusion that similar results
would obtain with another choice of WM task.
As in studies looking at effects of repeated exposure, however, an even more serious problem
prevents us from drawing conclusions about the islands debate from this type of evidence – this
work hinges upon on another poorly understood aspect of acceptability judgments. The question of
how individual differences in WM relate to acceptability judgments has never been systematically
investigated. While it is certainly plausible that individuals who score higher on memory tasks
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should exhibit less sensitivity to processing manipulations, this hypothesis requires validation with
uncontroversial data before it can be used to interpret contentious issues.
In another experiment, we sought to determine how WM differences predict judgments for
sentences that are grammatical but extremely difficult to process. To assess WM capacity, we
employed a reading span task along the lines of that described in Daneman and Carpenter (1980).
In such a task, participants read a series of sentences (2, 3, 4, or 5) and after reading all the sentences
in each series, subjects attempt to recall the last word from each sentence. Following suggestions
from Conway et al. (2005), we employed a partial-credit unit scoring method that corrects for the
problem that traditional all-or-nothing scoring discards a large amount of potentially useful data.
The materials (n = 24) for the experiment varied in two respects: (1) the distance between a
wh-phrase and its subcategorizing head and (2) the presence of either a subject or object relative
clause.
(13) a. [short-src] Someone figured out which politician wrote that Robert bribed a reporter
that trusted Nancy without thinking about it.
b. [short-orc] Someone figured out which politician wrote that Robert bribed a reporter
that Nancy trusted without thinking about it.
c. [long-src] Someone figured out which politician a reporter that trusted Nancy wrote
that Robert bribed without thinking about it.
d. [long-orc] Someone figured out which politician a reporter that Nancy trusted wrote
that Robert bribed without thinking about it.
28 Stanford University undergraduates, na¨ıve to the purposes of the study, provided the judgment
data. The LME model for analysis of the results included fixed effect factors for the two processing-
related factors, their interaction, reading span score and its interaction with the two manipulations
and their interaction. As Figure 2 depicts, higher WM scores are associated with higher acceptability
z-scores in the two relatively easy conditions with short dependencies, (13a) & (13b). But in the
more difficult conditions with long dependencies, (13c) & (13d), there is no evidence of relationship
between WM scores and judgments. This pattern accounts for the significant interaction between
WM and dependency length in the LME model of acceptability judgments (β = −.090, SE = .046,
t = −1.98, p = .049). In addition, the R2 between z-score and WM score in the conditions with long
dependencies is just .012. Such statistics would thus not reveal a relationship between judgments
and individual cognitive differences, despite the clear fact that it is the processing difficulty of these
items that yields the low acceptability ratings.
What these results tell us is that significant processing costs do not guarantee that individuals
with high WM capacities will rate the relevant items as more acceptable than individuals with rela-
tively low WM capacities. Perhaps items with long dependencies produce such extreme processing
difficulty that individual differences make insufficient difference. Items with short dependencies, in
contrast, are not so difficult to process, leaving room for differences due to individual variation to
emerge. These findings raise the possibility that the lack of WM effects in some island datasets may
follow from the extreme difficulty of such items. True or not, the above data from an uncontroversial
case of processing difficulty offers telling evidence that sentences with processing difficulties are not
always rated as more acceptable by individuals with high WM scores.
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Figure 2: Effects of reading span on acceptability z-score for sentence types with varying degrees
of difficulty
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In sum, WM estimates and processing difficulty are not straightforwardly related in acceptability
judgment tasks. Coupled with the possibility that unsuitable memory estimates may have been
used, the Sprouse et al. (in press) findings do not undermine processing-based accounts, nor are
they uniquely consistent with grammatical analyses of island effects. However, WM estimates may
still have a role to play in functional vs. formal debates of acceptability contrasts. Staum Casasanto
et al. (2010) present acceptability data showing that participants with higher reading spans judge
ungrammatical sentences as being worse than their low-span counterparts do, yet they judge difficult
(but not extremely difficult) sentences as being better than participants with lower reading span
scores. These patterns suggest that when positive linear relationships between acceptability and
WM measures are observed, functional pressures play a role in the acceptability contrasts. In short,
WM measures have the potential to identify functional factors at work in acceptability judgments,
but the absence of correlations or linear relationship cannot eliminate the possibility that processing
difficulty is the primary explanation for island effects.
5 The argument from overgeneration
Phillips (2006, in press) provides yet another argument against accounts that stress the role of
processing in island effects. In essence, the overgeneration argument states that if an individual can
demonstrate the capability to process and understand some construction, but nevertheless judges
it to be unacceptable, then this argues for the role of grammatical constraints:
“ . . . it is hard in such cases to argue that the overgenerated forms are ruled out
by limitations of the human representation-building capacity, since we have evidence
that speakers are able to construct exactly those representations. It therefore becomes
more likely that the constraint that normally blocks the overgenerated forms is a formal
grammatical constraint.” [Phillips, in press]
As an example, Phillips points to his work on subject islands and parasitic gap constructions
(Phillips, 2006). Acceptability data confirmed long-standing claims about the unacceptability of
filler-gap dependencies into subject NPs, as in (14a) below, compared to a minimally different
sentence with an object gap (14b):
(14) a. Which parts did [the attempt to repair ] ultimately damage the car?
b. Which parts did [the attempt to repair the car] ultimately damage ?
c. Which parts did [the attempt to repair ] ultimately damage ?
Critically, this acceptability evidence accompanies reading-time data showing signs of attempted
dependency formation inside infinitival subject NPs. Phillips infers that a dependency can be
made into infinitival subject NPs because subject-internal gaps are only highly acceptable in the
context of infinitival parasitic gap constructions like (14c). In non-finite subject NP contexts like
(15), however, parasitic gap constructions elicit low acceptability ratings and signs of dependency
formation via plausibility manipulations are absent:
(15) The outspoken environmentalist worked to investigate what the local campaign that pre-
served had harmed .
14
It is concluded that the parser only selectively violates subject island constraints when it can
potentially lead to an acceptable parasitic gap construction. Since subjects rate island-violating
sentences like (14a) as relatively unacceptable despite being to able to construct the dependency
as evidence by the plausibility effects, Phillips concludes that the unacceptability cannot be due to
resource limitations that affect dependency processing.
Key to this line of argumentation is an assumption attributed to processing-based accounts of
island effects: “if an island constraint is ultimately a consequence of limits on on-line structure
building, then we should not find that the constraint is spontaneously violated during on-line struc-
ture building” (Phillips, in press). That is, no signs of dependency formation should be evident in
island contexts, if processing accounts are true, because the excessive processing cost and lack of
cognitive resources should cut off any opportunity to make the dependency. Indeed, this predic-
tion does follow from some older processing-based accounts of island effects (Berwick & Weinberg
1984; Pritchett 1991), which assume that architectural properties of the parser impose functional
limitations that prevent dependencies from crossing certain clausal boundaries.
But this assumption is not a necessary property of a processing-based account of acceptability
contrasts and in particular it plays no role in limitation-based models of the sort we advocate. While
excessive processing demands may sometimes lead to a processing breakdown or retrieval failure,
processing costs will often simply create difficulty, without causing a total breakdown of parsing
processes. This point bears repeating: whether a parsing operation fails or succeeds depends on
how difficult it is, not just whether or not it is difficult, and thus predictions of difficulty do not
equal predictions of parsing failure. In this vein, processing accounts such as Hofmeister & Sag
(2010) emphasize that dependency formation inside islands is difficult, not impossible or prohibited.
Indeed, the variable cost of retrieval is a major driver in the overall processing difficulty of an island-
violating utterance, according to Hofmeister & Sag (2010), which would be impossible if dependency
formation never occurred.
It is worth pointing out yet again that the basic assumptions behind the overgeneration argument
would be better supported by examining uncontroversial cases. The argument assumes that wher-
ever it is possible to construct a representation, low judgments of acceptability must be explained in
terms of the violation of grammatical principles, rather than processing difficulty. However, it is not
at all clear that this conclusion is warranted. Sentences such as The administrator who the nurse
who was from the clinic supervised scolded the medic while a patient was brought into the emergency
room receive low acceptability ratings compared to semantically equivalent, right-branching struc-
tures such as The nurse from the clinic supervised the administrator who scolded the medic while a
patient was brought into the emergency room (Staum Casasanto et al. 2010). The comprehension
question accuracies for the different sentences were nearly identical (80.7% vs. 81.2%), however,
suggesting participants can ultimately represent and understand the nested sentence despite the
low ratings given. Thus, a sentence’s processing costs may give rise to low acceptability ratings
and yet simultaneously allow a comprehender to construct a coherent representation. In such a
case, the overgeneration argument would lead us to inaccurately conclude that grammatical prin-
ciples produce the low acceptability judgments. In light of such points, it seems critical to test the
overgeneration argument’s application to various uncontroversial cases before applying it to islands.
Overall, the argument based on overgeneration applies only to a limited set of processing ac-
counts that assume dependencies into island contexts are uniformly prohibited by architectural
constraints. For reasons discussed above, processing accounts such as ours (and those of Kluender
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(1991, 1992, 1998) and Kluender & Kutas (1993)) do not predict that speakers should categorically
attempt to create dependencies or that they should not; instead, they predict that comprehenders
are more likely to attempt to create dependencies, the easier they are to create. Even if they did
apply, the basic claim of the overgeneration argument has not withstood tests from less contentious
data. Hence, while we endorse efforts to find discriminating evidence that separates grammati-
cal from processing-based accounts, the overgeneration argument cannot help to distinguish these
positions.
6 Criticisms of processing accounts of island effects
Alongside attempts to find positive evidence for a grammatical source of island effects, proponents
of such an account also argue for it indirectly by pointing to challenges for processing accounts,
many of which are discussed in this volume. Although we cannot respond to all of these challenges
within the space of this chapter, we take up a few of the issues raised by Phillips (this volume) to
demonstrate that seeming problems for a processing account of island effects are not as problematic
as they are made out to be.
One challenge, related to the data covered in the previous section, is to explain why signs of
dependency creation appear in non-finite subject islands but not (some) other island contexts such as
finite subject islands.3 Phillips (this volume) presents this as problematic for a processing account,
because “if difficulty does not entail the absence of active gap-creation effects, then we should expect
to see active gap-creation effects in other types of islands”. But the contrast between non-finite
subject islands and finite ones is actually predicted by a processing perspective. Gibson (1998, p. 12)
suggests that only tensed verbs contribute to locality costs because only they introduce discourse
referents that are tracked in the discourse. Thus, non-finite clauses will be easier on average than
finite clauses to process. Accordingly, stronger evidence for dependency formation inside non-finite
islands should generally be easier to come by.
The existence of cross-linguistic variation is often raised as a further challenge for processing
accounts of island effects. Some languages show remarkably little island sensitivity, allowing struc-
tural dependencies that lead to sharp drops in acceptability in comparable sentences of English,
and some languages prohibit long-distance dependencies that English permits. Formal grammatical
accounts reckon with such variation in the following way: “When faced with a novel island effect,
or a novel case of cross-language variation, it is easy to simply add a constraint or parameter to
a grammatical account”, whereas “[r]esource-based reductionist accounts make strong predictions
about cross-language uniformity” (Phillips, this volume). This statement is accurate insofar as
speakers of all languages are assumed to have roughly identical cognitive constraints and sentence
processing architectures. The statement is inaccurate, however, in that accounts such as ours do
not assume that the costs associated with processing comparable structures are equivalent across
languages. There is no reason to assume that the cost of, say, forming a dependency between a
wh-word and an element inside a wh-island is the same from language to language. One language
3Phillips acknowledges that the parser can form a dependency into islands when forced to do so, e.g. wh-islands,
but argues that representability and well-formedness are two different things. From this view, some islands are
representable but ill-formed. It is not clear, though, how or whether representability and well-formedness can be
empirically separated via independent evidence.
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may utilize features and cues to aid retrieval that another does not, e.g. resumptives.4
Such an analysis of cross-linguistic differences in the case of Superiority violations (e.g. What did
who buy?) appears in Arnon, Snider, Hofmeister, Jaeger, & Sag (2006) who argue that the strength
of Superiority effects varies with the availability of case cues. Arnon et al. observe that Superiority
effects are larger in English than in German, while they appear to be entirely absent in Russian.
However, these languages also differ in the availability of case marking cues that can aid in the
processing of wh-dependencies. While English has no case marking on wh-phrases, case marking
exists for both German and Russian wh-phrases. Moreover, three out of seven case markings are
ambiguous between nominative and accusative in German, while only three out of ten are ambiguous
in Russian. A corpus study verified that unambiguous wh-words were three times more frequent in
Russian than German. Arnon et al. thus conclude that while there is a universal difficulty connected
to dependency processing, “the extent of the difficulty will depend on speakers ability to draw on
additional information”.
Nonetheless, it remains a challenge for processing accounts to identify what information varies
across languages along with island sensitivity. Although we do not claim at present to have a
full account of what the relevant variables are for each type of island, the absence of detailed
accounts should nevertheless not be taken to mean that processing accounts are incompatible with
the existence of cross-linguistic variation. While all languages face the same fundamental processing
problems, languages exhibit a diverse array of tools to solve those problems, and so we should not
expect a priori that any syntactic operation will incur the same cost across languages.
The last issue we briefly consider concerns learning. The problem, as described by Phillips, is
that, if the absence or rarity of island-violating sentences in the child’s input is due to resource
limitations, the child has to somehow know “that he should avoid drawing conclusions about the
target grammar from the gap”. This implies that there is a danger of a child positing a grammatical
ban for structures that are not represented sufficiently in the input. But this danger then would
apply to structures like multiply center-embedded sentences and sentences with wh-dependencies
that span a thousand words and other structures which are so difficult to process that they are
rarely, if ever, attested in natural speech. From the processing perspective, the learning problem
for islands is no different than it is for other hard-to-process structures: there is nothing to learn.
Recall what is being explained here – that dependencies into islands sound unacceptable. On the
analysis that this unacceptability stems from processing constraints, the child does not need any
feedback or guidance to learn this.
All this is not to say that processing accounts of islands are without weaknesses. One is that
different islands seem to pose different difficulties, preventing a uniform analysis for island effects.
Some phenomena like parasitic gaps, and why they improve subject islands, are also currently
without a detailed explanation. Furthermore, processing accounts of islands, still in their infancy,
have not yet provided a precise model of the relevant factors, their costs and the way these costs
combine. Moreover, as noted above, we do not yet know what all the factors are that lead to cross-
linguistic variability in island sensitivity. But we contend that many of these weaknesses reflect
4Wagers (this volume) expresses skepticism that resumptives facilitate dependency processing, on the basis of
acceptability data showing that resumptives are not preferred to gaps in non-island contexts. However, Hofmeister
& Norcliffe (to appear) demonstrate in a self-paced reading experiment that the acceptability data by itself is
misleading, and that resumptives do signicantly facilitate comprehension in long-distance dependencies that do not
violate islands.
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the early stages of the research on processing difficulty within islands, rather than some inherent
limitation of the approach.
7 Advancing the understanding of island effects
Our efforts here have been largely directed toward addressing the adequacy of accounts favoring
grammar-based interpretations of island effects. Along the way, we have observed that the lack of
systematic studies based on undisputed instances of processing-induced difficulty and/or violations
of grammatical constraints makes it extremely difficult to draw inferences about datasets like those
central to the islands debate. We also noted that numerous accounts of islands invoke grammar
as the root cause of the effects, without specifying what specific grammatical constraints are being
assumed. At present there exists no such account that is both empirically adequate and free from
capricious and arbitrary assumptions.
Furthermore, many of the main arguments in favor of grammatical accounts (or against processing-
based accounts) are either based on faulty assumptions or else dependent on data amenable to
alternative explanations, and the supporting evidence often takes the form of null results that are
hard to evaluate. Even if statistical tests and replication verify that the null results are extremely
unlikely to be spurious, this does not remove the possibility that some experimental confound lies
behind the null result. Given these points, the question arises: what kind of evidence would support
an account of island effects rooted in formal constraints?
Unfortunately, it remains unclear what kinds of evidence will be helpful in determining whether
island effects have a grammatical basis. A common theme across our discussions of the arguments for
grammatical accounts is that they rely on measures that have not yet been tested on uncontroversial
examples of formal and functional constraints. While we have undertaken a few experiments to
remedy this problem, answering how processing and grammatical constraints differ requires a larger
body of research comparing specific examples of constraints in order to license generalizations and
understand their limits. This is a considerable undertaking, but having a clear idea of how grammar
and processing influence the dependent measures we use is a critical prerequisite for using these
measures to draw conclusions about the basis of controversial contrasts. One possible outcome is
that there will not be clear behavioral differences that distinguish formal from functional constraints.
If it does not appear to be possible to operationalize this distinction, the logical conclusion may be
that this dichotomy is a construct that does not necessarily exist in the minds of language users.
Another potentially fruitful way of pursuing this debate is to classify the kinds of constraint
interactions, without resolving their basis. Whether functional and formal constraints are cleanly
separated in the mind or not, constraints that are more closely related to one another should share
more properties. These properties may include things like how constraints combine in acceptability
judgment tasks, how much variation occurs across individuals, how stable judgments are, how
judgments relate to other behavioral measures such as reading times, eye movements, and reaction
times, etc. By considering a variety of phenomena and examining how their properties differ from
one another, we can hope to classify island effects with respect to other, perhaps better understood
effects. For example, if island effects largely reflect formal constraints on hierarchical structure,
then they ought to resemble uncontroversial constraints on hierarchical structure in observable ways.
This is not meant to imply that constructions related by the source of their (un)acceptability should
display identical properties. However, a sufficiently large set of data built from non-controversial
18
cases should help us to define the range of variation and to notice patterns that characterize effects
that are conventionally ascribed to formal and functional constraints.
One might also reasonably ask how a processing account of islands could be disproved. Here,
we believe the answer is more straightforward. A processing-based account makes clear predictions
that island processing should be accompanied by signs of difficulty. Thus, if it was convincingly
shown that island structures lead to easier processing than minimally different non-island structures,
this would contradict the predictions of a processing-based theory. Additionally, processing-based
explanations of island effects would be weakened (although not disproved) by showing that there are
no reasons to expect that particular island effects should be linked to general processing principles.
And finally, such an account would be further weakened by research demonstrating that behavioral
and electrophysiological responses to islands contrast with responses to constructions with high
processing difficulty.
We believe the best strategy for moving forward in the islands debate involves developing a better
understanding of how a range of construction types pattern, not just with respect to acceptability
judgments, but dependent measures of all sorts. This will take time, but it has the potential to
help us resolve many questions about the roles of competence and performance in shaping the facts
we take as evidence for building syntactic theories. Progress on this issue is not optional; without
it, we cannot hope to come, as a field, to an informed understanding of the nature of grammar and
how it is embedded in a model of sentence processing.
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